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The Americans are currently in the process of presenting their impression of the security arrangement necessary for the reality of two states west of the Jordan River. In general, they have accepted Israel’s position on its specific security needs. Their proposed solutions, which they believe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will find satisfactory, are based on a variety of technological means and on a combination of, on the one hand, international peacekeeping forces on the eastern or Jordanian side of the Jordan River and, on the other hand, the Israel Defense Forces, which would remain in a narrow strip along the western side for a predetermined period of time.
According to this scenario, Israel seems to have already made far-reaching concessions because no mention is made in the Americans’ proposed security arrangements of the Jewish settlements currently situated in the Jordan Valley; the chief point of contention appears to be the nature and duration of Israel’s presence along the eastern side of Jordan River and at the various checkpoints along the river.
In this context, drawing any parallels between the Philadelphi Route, the road along the Israel-Egypt border dividing Egyptian Rafah from Palestinian Rafah in the Gaza Strip, and the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt following Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip is problematic, because the disengagement was not part of any peace agreement. Furthermore, the disengagement symbolizes for Israelis a total failure that must not be repeated.
The technological solutions that were formulated so that Israel would have the right to veto from afar the entry and departure of persons through the Rafah border checkpoint, with the help of European inspectors, collapsed even before they were supposed to begin. In a relatively short while, the European inspectors fled for their lives. This memory certainly does not assuage Israel’s fears, which the Americans are trying to address in the belief that they will be able to persuade the Palestinians to accept an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley for a number of years. For its part, Israel refuses to commit itself in advance as to the duration of that presence. The proposed time frames range from 40 years to forever.
From the security standpoint, Israel’s withdrawal from most of the West Bank would entail its relinquishing of strategic capabilities involving deterrence and detection and would seriously impair its ability to collect military intelligence and to effectively deal with the terrorist infrastructures that would develop in the area under Palestinian control.
The proponents of an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley argue that it is unlikely Arab armies will create an eastern front that poses a threat to Israeli national security over the next ten years. While this argument is correct, it is irrelevant in the debate on an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley: Security arrangements that form the basis of any peace agreement must be solid enough to withstand dramatic changes, and must provide Israel with a sufficiently wide security margin that would enable it to deal with sea changes, even if they should take place a few decades on.
At a time when the Middle East is undergoing enormous changes, it makes abundant sense to exercise the upmost caution regarding security arrangements. The second reason for such caution is the fact that, with regard to thwarting terror attacks, immense importance must be attached to territorial depth and to the degree of flexibility that it creates.
In order to enable the Palestinians to effectively deal with the security vacuum that would be created following the IDF’s departure, there is a need for considerable improvements in their ability to gather military intelligence, and for an additional increase in the size of their security forces. Without such changes, that vacuum would be filled by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In addition, the Palestinians’ current judicial and incarceration facilities are insufficient for effectively dealing with terrorism, and they must be built up and stabilized in order to enable the Palestinians to prevent the West Bank from turning into a giant terrorist base.
In order to prevent the deterioration of the security in the West Bank, and to enable the Palestinian government – which in the absence of internal legitimization will continue to display weakness and be undermined by factionalism – to exercise a reasonable measure of control, weapons and terrorists must be prevented from smuggling into the area.
The IDF and the Royal Jordanian Army already have a very satisfactory level of cooperation, and has managed to almost completely prevent infiltrations and weapons smuggling from the Kingdom of Jordan to the West Bank. The Jordanian army’s resolute determination to maintain this high level of cooperation with the IDF is impressive and stems from King Abdullah’s uncompromising guidelines, according to which no terrorist group should be allowed to endanger the sensitive relations between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Jordan’s commitment to its present security arrangement with Israel would diminish if the IDF were not to have a presence in the Jordan Valley. It is reasonable to assume that Jordan would allocate some of its military forces and some of its resources to deal with serious problems along its borders with Syria and Iraq and in the new refugee camps, which are a worrisome problem for Jordan and which can be expected to steadily increase in severity. The immediate result of such a situation would be a weakening of the present security arrangement in the Jordan Valley and continual threats to Israel’s national security.
There is no such thing as a perfect security arrangement. It is possible to arrive at a peace agreement that would involve some degree of risk. However, the duration of Israeli control of the Jordan Valley cannot be determined in advance. The stability of the Palestinian regime in the West Bank, the effectiveness of Palestinian efforts to fight terrorism and prevent arms smuggling into the West Bank, the level of collaboration with Israel, the stability of the Jordanian regime and Jordan’s commitment to peace, the development of the overall picture of threats from the east with particular emphasis on Syria and Iraq, the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and the connection with Iran – all these are part of the criteria which, if agreed upon by the parties (such agreement must also include the manner in which the above criteria are viewed and assessed), must form the basis on which the duration of Israel’s control of the Jordan Valley must be determined.
Major General (res.) Gadi Shamni is a former GOC Central Command of the Israel Defense Forces
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